SANA - Security Analysis in Internet Traffic through Artificial Immune Systems by Hilker, Michael & Schommer, Christoph
SANA -
Security Analysis in Internet Traffic through
Artificial Immune Systems
Michael Hilker1 and Christoph Schommer2
1 University of Luxembourg, Campus Kirchberg
1359, Luxembourg, 6, Rue Coudenhove-Kalergi, Luxembourg
michael.hilker@uni.lu
2 University of Luxembourg, Campus Kirchberg
1359, Luxembourg, 6, Rue Coudenhove-Kalergi, Luxembourg
christoph.schommer@uni.lu
Abstract. The Attacks done by Viruses, Worms, Hackers, etc. are a
Network Security-Problem in many Organisations. Current Intrusion De-
tection Systems have significant Disadvantages, e.g. the need of plenty of
Computational Power or the Local Installation. Therefore, we introduce
a novel Framework for Network Security which is called SANA. SANA
contains an artificial Immune System with artificial Cells which perform
certain Tasks in order to to support existing systems to better secure
the Network against Intrusions. The Advantages of SANA are that it is
efficient, adaptive, autonomous, and massively-distributed. In this Arti-
cle, we describe the Architecture of the artificial Immune System and the
Functionality of the Components. We explain briefly the Implementation
and discuss Results.
Keywords. Artificial Immune Systems, Network Security, Intrusion De-
tection, Artificial Cell Communication, Biological-Inspired Computing,
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1 Introduction
Companies, Universities, and other Organisations use connected Computers,
Servers, etc. for Working, Storing of important Data, and Communication. These
Networks are an Aim for Attackers in order to breakdown the Network Service
or to gain internal and secret Information.
These Attacks are Intrusions which are e.g. Worms, Viruses, Hacker-Attacks.
Network Administrators try to secure the Network against these Intrusions using
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The Network Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS) are a local System which is installed in one important Node and which
checks all Packets routed over this Node, e.g. SNORT [1] or [2,3,4,5,6]. Host-
based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) are installed on each Node and check
each Packet which is routed over this Node [7,8,9]. Furthermore, there are ap-
proaches of distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (D-IDS) which install IDS
on all machines and connect these; one example is SNORTNET [10].
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Unfortunately, these IDS have several Disadvantages as for example the
plenty of Computational Power, the need of Administration during Execution,
and local Installation. Additionally, the Intrusions are getting both more and
more complex and intelligent, so that the IDS have lots of Problems to identify
the Intrusions, e.g. Camouflage of Attacks. Thus, novel Approaches for Network
Security are needed which should provide the following features:
– Distributed: all Nodes should be secured and there should not be any central
Center
– Autonomous: the System and all Components should work autonomously;
hereby, the number of false-positives should be low
– Adaptive: the System should have the ability to identify or react to modified
or even novel Attacks
– Cooperative: The Computational Power should be shared over the whole
Network
In SANA, we introduce an artificial Immune System which provides the fea-
tures explained above. In the next Section, we discuss existing artificial Immune
Systems for the Application of Network Security.
2 Current Situation
For the explanation of the different existing artificial Immune Systems for Net-
work Security, we will introduce briefly the Paradigm of artificial Immune Sys-
tems [11]:
An artificial Immune System tries to simulate the human Immune System
which secures the Human Body against Pathogens [12]. An artificial Immune Sys-
tem is a massively distributed System and Complex Adaptive System with lots
of components. In the human Immune System, these Components are e.g. Cells,
Lymph-Nodes, Bone Marrow. All of these Components work autonomously, ef-
ficiently and are highly specialised. These Components cooperate using the Cell
Communication with e.g. Cytokines and Hormones. Additionally, there are lots
of cellular and immunological Processes which mesh in the Protection of the
Human Body. The artificial Immune Systems try to model these. Unfortunately,
the human Immune System and the Modelling of it is so complex and partly not
understood. Therefore, artificial Immune Systems can only model a part of the
human Immune System.
There are several artificial Immune Systems for Network Security. We discuss
some interesting Approaches of artificial Immune Systems for Network Security:
Spafford and Zamboni introduce in [13] a System for Intrusion Detection
using autonomous Agents. These Agents cooperate with Transceivers and do
not move through the Network. Hofmeyr and Forrester [14,15,16] introduce an
artificial Immune System for Network Security (named ARTIS/LISYS). The
AIS models the Lifecycle of T- and B-Cells with positive and negative Selec-
tion. The non-mobile Detectors check a Triple of Source-IP, Destination-IP and
Destination-Port and evaluate if a Packet is malicious or not. Additionally, in
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this Broadcast-Network, all Detectors see all Packets and react to it. In [17] an
artificial Immune System as a Multi-Agent System is introduced for Intrusion
Detection. The system uses mobile Agents which cooperate with a centralised
Database containing the Attack-Information.
In the next Section we introduce the Architecture of the artificial Immune
System SANA. In contrast to the existing artificial Immune Systems, SANA
uses autonomous, fully-mobile, and lightweighted artificial Cells; additionally,
SANA does not have any centralised System. Furthermore, SANA is not a closed
Framework; it is possible to use existing Network Security Approaches in SANA.
Thereafter, we take a closer look on the different Components of the artificial
Immune System.
3 SANA - Architecture
The artificial Immune System of SANA secures the whole Network against In-
trusions and provides the Features explained above. In SANA, we simulate a
packet-oriented Network using a Network Simulator (see Section 3.1). SANA is
a collection of non-standard Approaches for Network Security and we test if they
increase the Performance of existing Network Security Systems. An Adversarial
injects Packets with and without Attacks in order to stress the Network and the
artificial Immune System as well as to simulate Attacks (Section 3.2).
The artificial Immune System uses several Components for the Security of
the Network. All of these Components work autonomously and there is no Center
which is required by any Component. The main Components are artificial Cells,
Packet-Filters, IDS, etc. Packet-Filters are a local System that check the Header
of each Packet. IDS are local, non-mobile Systems which check Packets and ob-
serve the Network Traffic in order to secure the Node where the IDS is installed.
Artificial Cells (Section 3.3) are autonomous, fully-mobile, and lightweighted
Entities which flow through the Network and perform certain Tasks for Network
Security, e.g. Packet-Checking, Identification, of Infected Nodes or Monitoring of
the Network. Furthermore, artificial Cell Communication (Section 3.4) is used to
initialise Cooperation and Collaboration between the artificial Cells and a Self-
Management (Section 3.5) is utilised for a Regulation of the artificial Immune
System. In the next Sections, we take a closer look on the different Components
of SANA.
3.1 Network Simulator, Security Framework and Workflow
The Network Simulator simulates a Packet-Oriented Network and is based on
the Adversarial Queueing Theory [18,19,20]. The Simulator uses a FIFO (First
In First Out) approach for Queueing and for Routing the Shortest Path Routing
with the Dijkstra-Algorithm. It has a Quality of Service (QoS) Management
which prefers artificial Cells and other important Messages that are sent between
certified Components of the AIS.
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The Security Framework is the AIS which must be installed on each Node
of the Network. Furthermore, this Framework guarantees e.g. the execution of
the artificial Cells, the Presentation of Packets to all Security Components, the
Sending of Messages. The Design of the Security Framework is focussed on Ex-
pandability in order to enhance it and to use existing Approaches in Network
Security. One example of a Network Security Approach is Malfor [21], a system
for Identification of the Processes which are involved in the Installation of an
Intrusion.
The Workflow is that each Packet is checked in each Node by every Security
Component - e.g. artificial Cells, Packet-Filters, and IDS - each Security Compo-
nent can perform other Tasks - e.g. moving to other Nodes or sending Messages
- and the Adversarial injects Packets into the Network.
3.2 Adversarial and Attacks
An Adversarial has the Function to Stress the Network and the AIS using Packets
with and without Attacks; it has to keep in mind that the bandwidth of the
connection is limited and that the queues have limited size. The Adversarial
injects Packets without Attacks in order to simulate a real Network. The Packets
with Attacks try to infect Nodes with Attacks; the infected Nodes then perform
certain Tasks depending on the Attack, e.g. sending Packets with Attack to other
Nodes. The Attack is an abstract Definition for all Intrusions in SANA. So, nearly
all Intrusions can be modelled, e.g. Worms, Viruses, and Hacker-Attacks.
3.3 Artificial Cells
Artificial Cells are the main Component in the artificial Immune System of
SANA. An artificial Cell is a highly specialised, autonomous and efficient En-
tity which flows through the Network and performs certain Tasks for Network
Security. In the Cooperation and with the enormous Number of artificial Cells,
the whole System adapts quickly to Attacks and even to modified and novel At-
tacks; the idea of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) or Massively-Distributed
Systems.
Each artificial Cell has the Job to perform some certain Task:
– ANIMA for Intrusion Detection which is a type of artificial Cells for checking
Packets whether they contain an Attack or not. Furthermore, it compresses
the Information how to identify and how to proceed if an Attack is found
in order to save Storage-Space and Computational Power. More Information
about ANIMA-ID can be found in [22].
– AGNOSCO which is a type of artificial Cells for the Identification of Infected
Nodes using artificial Ant Colonies. It is a distributed System which identifies
the infected Nodes quickly and properly. More Information can be found in
[23].
– Monitoring artificial Cell which flows through the Network and collects In-
formation about the Status and send this back to some certain Component,
e.g. the Administrator.
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– Using the Expandability of SANA, it is easily possible to introduce novel ar-
tificial Cells. Thus, it is e.g. possible to introduce artificial Cells for Anomaly
Detection or Checking of the Status of a Network Node.
– Additionally, it is possible to use existing Approaches for Network Security.
With the Expandability of SANA, these Approaches can be used in an artifi-
cial Cell; examples are Systems for Intrusion- [22,24] or Anomaly-Detection
Systems [25,26,27].
3.4 Artificial Cell Communication
The idea in Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is that the Components (here: arti-
ficial Cells) perform basic Tasks, are highly specialised and use basic Systems for
Cooperation. Only by Cooperation and the high amount of these Components,
the System is adaptive and reaches the goal (here: Network Security).
The whole Architecture in SANA is composed without any central System.
Thus, the artificial Cell Communication cannot use a Central Management Sys-
tem like it is used in several Multi Agent Systems or Ad-Hoc Networks. We
model partly the Cell Communication of the Human Body in order to build up
Communication and, thereafter, Cooperation between artificial Cells.
We introduce the Term Receptor which is a Public-Key-Pair. Each Compo-
nent has Receptors and each Message is packed into a Substance which is an
encrypted Message with Receptors. Only if a Receiver has the right Set of Re-
ceptors, it will receive the Message - the Idea of a Public-Key Infrastructure and
widely used in Multi Agent System for the Disarming of Bad-Agents/-artificial
Cells; however, in our Implementation, there is not any centralised Key-Server.
Additionally, we introduce artificial Lymph Nodes and Central Nativity and
Training Stations (CNTS). Artificial Lymph Nodes supply the artificial Cells
with e.g. Knowledge, initiate other artificial Cells if an event occurs and artificial
Lymph Nodes care about the Routing of Substances. CNTS train and release
new artificial Cell in order to have an evolutionary Set of artificial Cells which
are up-to-date. Both, artificial Lymph Nodes and Central Nativity and Training
Stations, are redundant installed in the System.
3.5 Self-Management of the artificial Immune System
The Self-Management of the System is currently only rudimentary. The artificial
Cells are autonomous and thus they flow through the Network and perform cer-
tain Tasks. However, one Problem of Massively-Distributed Systems or Complex
Adaptive Systems is that they just do their Tasks but there is not any guarantee
that the Systems will do the Tasks successfully. On the basis of the artificial Cell
Communication and novel Structures, we want to introduce a distributed Self-
Management of the artificial Immune System in order to give a certain amount
of Guarantee. However, this is one of the Next Steps explained in the Section 6.
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4 SANA - Implementation
The Project SANA is implemented in Java. The Network Simulator, Adversarial,
and the artificial Immune System are implemented and running. Different Types
of artificial Cells are implemented. The Performance of these artificial Cells is
tested and they perform the Tasks properly. Attack-Scenarios are additionally
implemented for Testing Purposes and one example is a realistic Worm-Attack
which will be discussed in the Section 5.1.
The whole Implementation has the aim to give a Prototype for Testing and
Evaluation of the Approaches. Furthermore, the Implementation focuses more
on Expandability than on Performance; it is also possible to model nearly all
Intrusions and nearly all immunological Processes. It is also possible to add
common used Network Security Solutions like SNORT [1] or Malfor [21]. With
this, we can compare the Performance of SANA with common used IDS and we
can model cooperation between SANA and IDS.
5 SANA - Results
The Results we gained are promising. SANA identifies most Attacks - about
60%-85% - depending on the Attack-Behaviour, the Network Topology and the
Behaviour of the artificial Immune System with the artificial Cells. The infected
Nodes are identified quickly by AGNOSCO and the System adapts to Attacks
using local Immunization.
If there are IDS or especially NIDS in the Network which protect important
Nodes like the Internet Gateway or the E-Mail-Server, there is cooperation be-
tween SANA and the IDS with a good performance - about 80%-95% of the
Attack are prevented. Thus, SANA does not replace existing IDS, it enhances
them.
In the next Section, we discuss the Results of a Simulation of a realistic
Worm-Attack.
5.1 Simulation of a Worm-Attack
In this Section, we discuss a Modelling of a realistic Worm-Attack onto the Net-
work. The Worm enters a Network and uses a Security-Hole in a Node in order
to install itself. After this, the Worm tries to propagate it to other Nodes; there-
fore, it sends lots of Packets containing a copy of it to other Nodes. SANA tries
to identify and remove these Packets, identifies the infected Nodes and disinfects
the identified infected Nodes. Therefore, SANA uses the different types of arti-
ficial Cells explained in the Section 3.3 and the artificial Cell Communication
explained in the Section 3.4.
The Performance of SANA in this Simulation is promising. It secures other
Nodes from being infected by this Worm using ANIMA for Intrusion Detection
[22]; only some Neighbour-Nodes are infected (about 2-5 Nodes for each Infec-
tion). It also identifies the infected Nodes using AGNOSCO [23] quickly (about
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50-150 Time-Steps for each infected Node) and using the artificial Cell Commu-
nication (Section 3.4), AGNOSCO informs the artificial Lymph-Nodes (Section
3.4) which start an artificial Cell for Disinfection which disinfect the Node fast.
To sum up, SANA protects the Network against a Worm-Attack properly.
5.2 Theoretical Analysis of distributed IDS
In the theoretical Part of the SANA-Project, we compare the Performance and
the Need of Resource of distributed and centralised Network Security Systems.
Examples for centralised are e.g. IDS and for distributed AIS. However, the
Analysis shows quickly that the Performance of the both Approaches is highly
dependent on the Network Topology and the Behaviour of the Intrusions. The
Analysis fortunately shows that the Performance of IDS is increased if AIS are
added and the additionally needed Resources are limited.
6 SANA - Next Steps
Next Steps in the SANA-Project are to simulate realistic Attacks on Networks,
e.g. different Worm, Virus and Malwar-Attacks; also Attacks which consists of
several different Attacks. Additionally, another part is to increase the Perfor-
mance of the artificial Cell Communication (Section 3.4) and analyse the Per-
formance of it theoretically. Furthmore, we will introduce a Self-Management
(Section 3.5) which guarantees a certain amount of Security and we will perform
further theoretical Comparison (Section 5.2) between distributed and centralised
Network Security Systems.
7 Conclusion
Network Security is still a challenging field. Unfortunately, the Attacks are get-
ting both more complex and intelligent. Therefore, existing Network Security
Systems have problems to cope with these Problems. We introduce with SANA
an artificial Immune System with several non-standard Approaches for Network
Security. With the gained Results, we are sure that SANA will enhance current
Network Security Systems.
One last word about SANA: SANA is Latin and stands for healthy. Further-
more, the Work is done interdisciplinary in cooperation between Researchers
from Biology and Computer Science.
Acknowledgments
The PhD-Project SANA is part of the project INTRA (= INternet TRAffic man-
agement and analysis) that are financially supported by the University of Lux-
embourg. We would like to thank the Ministre Luxembourgeois de l’education
et de la recherche for additional financial support.
8 M. Hilker, C. Schommer
References
1. Roesch, M.: Snort - lightweight intrusion detection for networks. LISA 13 (1999)
229–238
2. Debar, H., Dacier, M., Wespi, A.: Towards a taxonomy of intrusion-detection
systems. Computer Networks 31 (1998) 805–822
3. Snapp, S.R., Brentano, J., Dias, G.V., Goan, T.L., Heberlein, L.T., lin Ho, C.,
Levitt, K.N., Mukherjee, B., Smaha, S.E., Grance, T., Teal, D.M., Mansur, D.:
DIDS (distributed intrusion detection system) - motivation, architecture, and an
early prototype. National Computer Security Conference 14 (1991) 167–176
4. Staniford-Chen, S., Cheung, S., Crawford, R., Dilger, M., Frank, J., Hoagland, J.,
Levitt, K., Wee, C., Yip, R., Zerkle, D.: Grids - a graph based intrusion detection
system for large networks. National Information Systems Security Conference 19
(1996)
5. Janakiraman, R., Waldvogel, M., Zhang, Q.: Indra: A peer-to-peer approach to
network intrusion detection and prevention. Proceedings of IEEE WETICE 2003
(2003)
6. Antonatos, S., Anagnostakis, K., Polychronakis, M., Markatos, E.: Performance
analysis of content matching intrusion detection systems. SAINT 4 (2004)
7. Wagner, D., Dean, D.: Intrusion detection via static analysis. In IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (2001)
8. Lindqvist, U., Porras, P.A.: expert-bsm: A host-based intrusion detection solution
for sun solaris. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference (2001) 240–251
9. Chari, S.N., Cheng, P.C.: Bluebox: A policy-driven, host-based intrusion detection
system. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 6 (2003) 173–200
10. Fyodor, Y.: Snortnet’ - a distributed intrusion detection system. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://snortnet.scorpions.net/snortnet.pdf (2000)
11. DeCastro, L.N.: Artificial Immune Systems: A New Computational Intelligence
Approach. First edn. Springer (2002)
12. Janeway, C.A., Travers, P., Walport, M., Shlomchik, M.: Immunobiology: the
Immune System in Health and Disease. Sixth edn. Garland Publishing (2004)
13. Spafford, E.H., Zamboni, D.: Intrusion detection using autonomous agents. Com-
puter Networks 34 (2000) 547–570
14. Hofmeyr, S.A., Forrest, S.: Immunity by design: An artificial immune system.
Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference 2 (1999)
1289–1296
15. Hofmeyr, S.A., Forrest, S.: Architecture for an artificial immune system. Evolu-
tionary Computation 8 (2000) 443–473
16. Hofmeyr, S.A., Forrest, S.: Immunology as information processing. (2000)
17. Machado, R.B., Boukerche, A., Sobral, J.B.M., Juca, K.R.L., Notare, M.S.M.A.:
A hybrid artificial immune and mobile agent intrusion detection based model for
computer network operations. IPDPS ’05: Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Interna-
tional Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS’05) - Workshop 6
19 (2005)
18. Andrews, Baruch Awerbuch, Antonio Fernndez, Tom Leighton, Zhiyoung Liu and
Jon Kleinberg, M.: Universal-Stability Results and Performance Bounds for Greedy
Contention-Resolution Protocols. Journal of the ACM 48 (2000) 39–69
19. Hilker, M.: Queueing Strategies in Internet Routing. Diploma Thesis at the Johann
Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt/M., Germany (2005)
SANA - Security Analysis in Internet Traffic 9
20. Hilker, M., Schommer, C.: A new queueing strategy for the adversarial queueing
theory. IPSI-2005 Slovenia (2005)
21. Neuhaus, S., Zeller, A.: Isolating intrusions by automatic experiments. 13th Annual
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2006)
22. Hilker, M., Schommer, C.: Description of bad-signatures for network intrusion
detection. AISW-NetSec 2006 during ACSW 2006, CRPIT 54 (2006)
23. Hilker, M., Schommer, C.: Agnosco - identification of infected nodes with artificial
ant colonies. RASC 2006 (2006)
24. Finizio, I., Mazzariello, C., Sansone, C.: A temporal-behavior knowledge space for
detecting intrusions in computer networks. RASC 2006 (2006)
25. Sekar, R., Gupta, A., Frullo, J., Shanbhag, T., Tiwari, A., Yang, H., Zhou, S.:
Specification-based anomaly detection: a new approach for detecting network in-
trusions. Volume 9. (2002) 265–274
26. Lazarevic, A., Ertoz, L., Ozgur, A., Srivastava, J., Kumar, V.: A comparative
study of anomaly detection schemes in network intrusion detection. Proceedings
of Third SIAM Conference on Data Mining 3 (2003)
27. Leung, K., Leckie, C.: Unsupervised anomaly detection in network intrusion de-
tection using clusters. Australasian Computer Science Conference 28 (2005)
